Recently David Best has advanced the claim that sport is not an art form, and that although sport may be aesthetic, it is not artistic. Such a claim is false and runs counter to ordinary usage and sport practice. On behalf of sport practice, let me cite as an example the world-class Canadian skater, Toller Cranston, who thinks there are such things as ‘artistic sports, those being gymnastics, diving, figure skating’. Best claims that athletes like Cranston are conceptually confused and (...) that they endow sport with greater respectability than should be allowed. Ascribing the predicate ‘artistic’ to sport performances reflects ‘barbarous usage’. Why does Best exclude the artistic from the realm of sport? Upon examination of his argument, one finds that this exclusion derives mainly from his concepts of art and sport. He thinks that art has a subject-matter, a content, and that sport does not. Sport is contentless, so ‘sport’ and ‘art’ are two logically distinct regions. But is this so? Are we to accept Best's argument or are we to listen to accomplished, reflective athletes in the area of artistic sports? It seems the most reasonable analytic procedure would be to listen to Cranston's case and decide whether such a piece of intentionalist criticism5 should override Best's premises. (shrink)

A summary view of the main evidence at our disposal may be soon obtained. Three traditions appear at the outset. The first depends on a MS. once at Mainz, and now no longer extant, but of which part, at any rate, still existed in the sixteenth century; the second on an eleventh century MS. at Bamberg; and the third on a number of later MSS. in Rome, Florence, Paris, the British Museum, Oxford, Holkham, and other places. The fact that these (...) three traditions must be regarded as separate may be seen first from the parts of the decade which they each omit. (shrink)

This volume brings together essays that discuss and contextualise Gandhi's ideas on pluralism, religious identity, non-violence, satyagraha, and modernity. It interrogates the epistemic foundations of Gandhian thinking and weltanschauung, identifies diverse strands within his arguments, and gives it new meaning in contemporary society. This book focuses on Gandhi's engagements with religious, political, and social conflicts; his reflections on faith and modernity; and his argumentative dialogues with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and B. R. Ambedkar. It provides critical insights into Gandhi's philosophy and (...) suggests ways of engaging with his ethical and moral ideas in contemporary intellectual and political discourse. Comparing and contrasting Gandhian thought and strategies with contemporary issues and conceptions of religious freedom, conflict resolution, and liberalism, the volume reformulates and reconstitutes his intellectual and political legacy. This book points to new and possible future directions of research on Gandhian concepts and will be useful for scholars in the fields of political science, Gandhian studies, sociology, and philosophy. (shrink)

There seems to exist a dilemma in the literature as to the correct relativistic formula for the Sagnac phase-shift. The paper addresses this issue in the light of a novel, kinematically equivalent linear Sagnac-type thought experiment, which provides a vantage point from which the effect of rotation in the usual Sagnac effect can be analyzed. The question is shown to be related to the so-called rotating disc problem known as the Ehrenfest paradox. The relativistic formula for the Sagnac phase-shift seems (...) to depend on the way the paradox is resolved. Kinematic resolution of the Ehrenfest paradox proposed by some authors predicts the usually quoted formula for the Sagnac delay but the resolution itself is shown to be based upon some implicit assumptions regarding the behaviour of solid bodies under acceleration. In order to have a greater insight into the problem, a second version of the thought experiment involving linear motion of a “special type” of a non-rigid frame of reference is discussed. It is shown by analogy that the usually quoted special relativistic formula for the Sagnac delay follows, provided the material of the disc matches the “special type.”. (shrink)

This essay seeks to clarify Gandhi's logic of self-suffering. Its inner accents have not received the attention they deserve. So I propose to emphasize them, though the context of such suffering and its impact on men too must be given due regard.

Some may be of the opinion that one event can begin before another only by virtue of the existence of some event (a “witness”) which wholly precedes the other and does not wholly precede the one (and similarly for “ends before” and “does not abut”). Those would prefer $\mathbb{F}$ 0 to $\mathbb{F}$ as a model for observers' apprehensions of events. Since G is a functor from $\mathbb{M}$ to $\mathbb{F}$ 0, the current construction (restricted to $\mathbb{F}$ 0) remains applicable.This work supports (...) a claim that the psychologically fundamental temporal relationships are “wholly precedes”, “begins before”, “ends before” and “abuts”. But only in a very weak sense. Any other set of relationships which is interdefinable with this one, using only quantifier-free formulas in the definitions, could be used to define a category $\mathbb{F}$ ′ which is indistinguishable from $\mathbb{F}$ (because the same functions preserve and reflect the new relationships). This work equally supports the claim that those relationships are the psychologically fundamental ones, or the claim that it is just “wholly precedes” which is fundamental, and that we perceive “begins before” just by virtue of witnesses. But it refutes the claim that only “wholly precedes” is fundamental, and that we understand “begins before” only because we understand time as a linear ordering. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art's DetourA Clash of Aesthetic TheoriesS. K. Wertz (bio)Both John Dewey1 and Martin Heidegger2 thought that art's audience had to take a detour in order to appreciate or understand a work of art. They wrote about this around the same time (mid-1930s) and independently of one another, so this similar circumstance in the history of aesthetics is unusual since they come from very different philosophical traditions. What was it (...) about the climate of the times that led them to such an idea? Is it still viable today? Both philosophers thought that art's audience is not in a position to immediately appreciate works of art—that we are missing something for a direct appreciation or apprehension—so we must take a detour. Why the detours and what are they? Are the detours similar? And are Dewey and Heidegger right about this? The essay that unfolds below attempts to answer these questions.First a definition is in order so we know what the term "detour" means when I use it. What is a detour? It is a deviation from a direct course or the usual procedure; a roundabout way temporarily replacing part of a route; in other words, a bypass or a roundabout way to some destination. The Little Oxford Dictionary adds a different twist on my characterization: "a course that leaves and rejoins [the] direct route."3 Applying this idea to art, we can say that a detour describes an audience who ordinarily perceives an artwork is a legitimate beginning for an appreciation of it, but that course must be bypassed for another (conception) before it can rejoin the direct route (perception). In other words, perceptions in the aesthetic experience must be aided by conceptions—a decidedly Kantian stance taken by Dewey and Heidegger. Their illustrations make my interpretation plausible.One of Heidegger's examples is Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant boots.4 He selects this painting to illustrate his metaphysics, which centers around the notion of "equipment." Peasant boots are equipment in [End Page 100] the sense that they are worn or used; the mere thing (like shoes or boots in a store [exhibited] or a closet [in storage]) disappears in use and becomes equipment. Between equipment and mere things—these two categories of being—are artworks. They are pictorial representations of equipment (in Heidegger's illustration; a pair of shoes as mere things could be a pictorial representation, like an advertisement, but it wouldn't be the same). Through the painted boots, a world comes into focus—a network of meaning. The world Heidegger sees in the Van Gogh painting is captured in the following descriptions: "In the vicinity of the [art]work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be…. The art work let us know what shoes are in truth" (ATCR 233). So the nature of art is still a question about the nature of representation for Heidegger: it is what the shoes disclose to us about human existence. As he says, it is not just merely a pair of shoes portrayed but shoes "from the dark opening of the worn insides … the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth" (ATCR 232). In other words, we see the difficult labor that this particular owner toiled with in her daily chores.In Tralbaut's book, he quotes Heidegger in a caption alongside the painting: "Engraving in the intimate obscurity of the hollow of a boot is the weariness of the steps of work. The rough and solid weight of the clog tells of the slow and obstinate trudge across the fields."5 Heidegger continues in the same vein:In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of... (shrink)

Central to Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. Such a notion of incommensurability is based on a particular understanding of what a scientific language is. In this paper we first attempt to understand this notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability. We consider the consequences of the essential multisemiotic character of scientific theories and show how this leads to even a single theory (...) being potentially ‘internally incommensurable’. We then discuss Kuhn’s lexicon‐based approach to incommensurability and the problems associated with it. Finally we argue that this approach by Kuhn has interesting overlaps with the problem of meaning associated with multisemiosis, particularly the challenge of understanding the process of symbolization in scientific theories. (shrink)

BackgroundReducing the number of animals used in experiments has become a priority for the governments of many countries. For these reductions to occur, animal-free alternatives must be made more available and, crucially, must be embraced by researchers.MethodsWe conducted an international online survey for academics in the field of animal science (N = 367) to explore researchers’ attitudes towards the implementation of animal-free innovations. Through this survey, we address three key questions. The first question is whether scientists who use animals in (...) their research consider governmental goals for animal-free innovations achievable and whether they would support such goals. Secondly, responders were asked to rank the importance of ten roadblocks that could hamper the implementation of animal-free innovations. Finally, responders were asked whether they would migrate (either themselves or their research) if increased animal research regulations in their country of residence restricted their research.ResultsWhile nearly half (40%) of the responders support governmental goals, the majority (71%) of researchers did not consider such goals achievable in their field within the near future. In terms of roadblocks for implementation of animal-free methods, ~ 80% of the responders considered ‘reliability’ as important, making it the most highly ranked roadblock. However, all other roadblocks were reported by most responders as somewhat important, suggesting that they must also be considered when addressing animal-free innovations. Importantly, a majority reported that they would consider migration to another country in response to a restrictive animal research policy. Thus, governments must consider the risk of researchers migrating to other institutes, states or countries, leading to a ‘brain-drain’ if policies are too strict or suitable animal-free alternatives are not available.ConclusionOur findings suggest that development and implementation of animal-free innovations are hampered by multiple factors. We outline three pillars concerning education, governmental influence and data sharing, the implementation of which may help to overcome these roadblocks to animal-free innovations. (shrink)